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1 Introduction
As old as economics as an independent science is the question what factors
and forces determine individual wages in the labour market. One central
issue in this respect concerns the role of a firm in wage setting. Here the
ambiguity can be encapsulated in an auxiliary question, namely, whether
firms act as price takers (i.e wage-takers) merely paying labour the same
that all the other firms pay, or alternatively, whether it is rather the case
that different firms may remunerate productively homogenous workers dif-
ferently solely due to differences in their firm-specific attributes. The latter
alternative indicates firm-specific pay policies and firms having an active role
in wage determination. Of course, if this is the case, then it should be also
empirically verifiable. Or the other way round, if firms possess no decision
power over wage setting then none of the firm-specific characteristics should
enter significantly in a corresponding wage equation.
One of the main characteristics essential for any enterprise’s life is its
economic success which determines both its employment as well as, in the
end, whether the firm will exist in the future. Economic success can be
measured by various profitability indicators which all are firm-specific by
their nature. Therefore, the question whether firm profitability, a major
backbone of any firm, enters significantly in the wage equation of a certain
group of firms is not only of economic interest for these particular firms but
it is also a direct empirical proof for these firms not merely being price takers
vis a` vis the wages they pay.
The question whether the employer firm’s profits affect the wages it pays
forms the main subject of the current study. We investigate the potential
relationship between individual wages and firm-level real profits asking if
employees’ real wages respond to their employer firm’s per capita profits?
However, when thinking about the potential relation between firm profitabil-
ity and wages - being called ”the rent sharing hypothesis” in the literature -
it needs to be borne in mind that not only a Walrasian perfectly competitive
labour market but even a labour market characterised by highly aggregated
collective wage bargaining system is able to produce an outcome where single
firms in practice act as price-takers with respect to wages they pay.
Therefore we consciously avoid the view of a highly simplified textbook
labour market model according to which a collective negotiations system is
inconsistent with the competition mechanism. Instead, our interest being
focused on the Finnish labour market, we know that even though the basic
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framework is the highly centralised collective wage negotiations system it is
combined with a wage drift portion added over and above the collectively
determined wage increases. Furthermore, the order of importance of vari-
ous driving forces behind the wage drift phenomenon being still empirically
unsolved, it is also possible that wage drift actually mirrors the ”competi-
tive side” of wage determination even in the labour market characterised by
collective wage negotiations.1 Thus, in this study we are not making claims
about whether the Finnish labour market can be characterised totally non-
competitive or not. What we do claim, instead, is that if we find support for
the rent sharing hypothesis then a single firms’ role is not merely that of a
price taker even though the final balancing between collective negotiations
versus competitive forces is left for future research.2
By the side of these theoretical aspects connected with competitiveness of
the labour market there are, at least, two purely practical reasons for making
the relation between firm profits and wages of economic and political interest.
Firstly, for a single enterprise the relation is a highly practical issue since for
it life is balancing between revenues and production costs both subject to
continuous alteration. Thus at a firm level the question of how to deal with
these changing pecuniary factors is crucial. Basically, profits are defined as
the difference of revenues and costs. This means that as revenues change a
firm have an unambiguous need to readjust both its production level and its
production costs in order to preserve a certain level of profitability per a unit
produced. Therefore the cost of labour, an integral factor of production, and
the way it is being determined is of a central interest for any firm.
Secondly, at an economy level, and especially for a small open economy
as Finland the question of how to protect domestic enterprises against ex-
ogenous profitability shocks originating from abroad is of foremost interest
making the prices of domestic production factors of the essence. Especially,
since labour is a major domestic factor of production and its price is deter-
mined to a large degree within the country, it is natural to pay attention to
1This view gains further strength by the fact that in Finland the collective wage in-
creases form the minimum increase only. That is, there is no ”roof” for the wage increases
a single firm may pay. Therefore as long as the collective increases remain modest there
is a natural case even for competitive forces to affect the level of total wage increases.
2Naturally, in a collective wage negotiations system firms possess collectively - through
an employer union - a certain amount of decision power over the wage level. Our research
concerns instead whether they as individual firms are able and willing to adjust their
labour cost with respect to the firm-specific ability to pay?
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wages and salaries as means of adjustment to foreign profitability shocks. On
the other hand, inflationary pressures may arise through the wage-price spiral
mechanism making it essential to be aware of all the factors affecting wage
inflation. Therefore, after the introduction of the common currency - euro -
brought to an effective end the policy of recurrent intentional devaluations of
the domestic currency as a means of adjustment against foreign shocks, there
has arisen a lengthy discussion within the euro area, inclusively in Finland,
about wage rigidities and whether labour costs should be more flexible in
order to protect more effectively domestic firm’s economic lucrativeness and,
consequently, their employment during economic downturns.
Moving on to the practical details of the study, the estimation data is
collected from amongst the Finnish central industrial employer organisation
TT ’s member enterprises operating in the metal and electrotechnical indus-
try and the observations consist of white-collar employees during the six-year
period 1995-2001.3
Firm profits are measured with two alternative measures. The first mea-
sure is real operating profits per employee excluding revenues from sales of
tangible capital goods. Operating profits, however, may suffer from a - sort
of - calculatory endogeneity problem because there is a linear negative rela-
tionship between the size of a firm’s operating profits and its total labour
costs. This means that operating profits, at the enterprise level, depend
on the same factor, wages, that we, at the employee level, try to explain.
Therefore we need to test the robustness of estimated operating profits ef-
fects. This can be done by using some other profitability measure being not
as prone to suffer from the same kind of endogeneity bias. Our choice for this
alternative profitability measure is real value added per employee and it is
chosen simply because the concept of value added is, by definition, revenues
minus production costs except for personal costs being included in these and
therefore a firm’s total labour costs do not affect the size of its value added
in contrast to the size of its operating profits.
In addition to this, there is even a more theoretical motivation for using
value added as an explanatory variable in a rent sharing model. Namely,
on the theoretical side rent sharing focuses on one fundamental question of
how to define the ”pie” to be divided between the firm and its employees?
3The sample covers in effect TT ’s all member firms with at least 30 employees. A part
of minor member enterprises includes as well. Thus, the size and panel character of the
data in hand enables us to take even advantage of advanced panel data methods.
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From this perspective, actually, ”pre-wage” value added can be thought to
form even a more proper measure for firm profitability and performance than
”post-wage” operating profits are likely to do.
Our empirical analysis starts with a multivariate wage model including
only observed effects. After that we move on to test robustness of the first-
hand findings. The model specifications will be modified to control for unob-
served employee- and firm-specific effects. Thus we will test the robustness of
the observed correlation (or alternatively, non-correlation) between individ-
ual wages and firm profitability by analysing carefully whether our first-hand
results remain intact as we add statistical fine controls. In addition to con-
trolling for observed and unobserved firm- and employee-specific effects, we
will, in due course, consider also effects of lagged profits on wages and discuss
further the problem of endogeneity w.r.t profits.
A major novelty is a much more detailed treatment of different wage
specifications as in previous studies. The approach is to repeat each analysis
for a number of different wage concepts in turn starting from the monthly
base wage and, after having gradually added new components, ending up with
a one containing, in addition to base salary, benefits in kind, supplements for
shift and Sunday work, performance-related payments4, over-time earnings
and (for the years 1998-2001) direct profit-related payments5. In this way we
try to find out whether rent sharing is equally important at the base wage
level, or alternatively, whether it arises only after different bonus elements
and over-time supplements are included.
Especially, our approach offers new insights into the wage drift phe-
nomenon. Namely, if it is empirically verified that even base wages respond
to changes in firm profits, then this adds to our knowledge about the forces
4Performance-related payments predominantly depend on how well employees manage
to achieve predetermined operational targets (eg. relating to productivity, delivery relia-
bility and customer service) but they may also depend - though to a lesser degree - even
on the company’s financial performance. Thus the classification between ”performance-
related” and ”profit-related” bonuses is more of a gradual than mutually exclusive nature.
5The concept covers irregularly paid components depending, above all, on the com-
pany’s overall financial performance (eg. turnover, operating profit, value added and
return on capital). These consist of the two independent systems. Firstly, there are the
payments within the frame of the personnel funds system but being paid directly to the
personnel (in contrast to the profit-related payments being paid as shares to personnel
funds and not being included in this study). Secondly, there are the direct profit-related
payments being determined, more or less ad hoc, by the company’s top management or in
a shareholder’s meeting.
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behind the wage drift phenomenon. It explicitly shows that wage drift is
not merely a structural phenomenon brought about by changes in the overall
composition of labour force but instead even one and the same individual’s
base wage follows to a certain extent her employer’s bad or good fortunes
through time.6 In other words, firms already adjust to changes in their prof-
itability by altering even base wages ex post in contrast to being exclusively
confined to explicit profit sharing schemes operating on a totally predeter-
mined basis.
The structure of the paper is the following. We inspect first previous
research on the rent-sharing and profit-sharing hypotheses. After that we
discuss how the rent-sharing hypothesis can be rendered a theoretical basis
both using the competitive as well as the non-competitive framework. Thus
there exists a theoretical foundation for a positive relationship between in-
dividual wages and firm-level profits independently on whether the labour
market is assumed competitive or non-competitive. The third chapter pre-
pares for empirical analysis as we describe the used data. The fourth chapter
consists of the empirical analysis. Finally, a concluding discussion follows.
2 Previous rent-sharing research and theo-
retical underpinnings
In a competitive labour market individual wages should reflect only a per-
son’s marginal productivity. Thus, changing jobs to another more prof-
itable firm should not affect a person’ wage as long as her/his productivity-
determining characteristics and non-pecuniary working conditions remain un-
changed. However, this hypothesis has long been questioned. An early exem-
plar of questioning the relevance of the competitive labour market model is
found in Slichter (1950) who claimed that empirical evidence does not sup-
port the competitive approach with its one-price hypothesis as apparently
homogenous workers are paid differently across industries. Using data on
workers in US manufacturing he found that wages were correlated with var-
ious measures of the employer’s ability to pay. Later, with the emergence of
6Usually wage drift, the difference between actual and bargained wages, is measured
at aggregate level using mean wages. As a result of this approach, however, the changes
in the aggregate wage level induced by changes in the overall composition of labour force
(e.g rising educational level of workforce causing a rise of average wages) will be mixed
with the wage increase of a ”qualitatively standardised” labour input.
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more extensive data sources, a substantial number of empirical evidence has
emerged that tends to strengthen Slichter’s early findings.
There have also emerged several theoretical models in which a positive
relation between a firm’s profitability and individual wages appears. In theo-
retical literature the positive correlation between wages and firm profitability
is usually thought to arise from an noncompetitive labour market set-up even
though there are rent sharing models where labour market, at least in the
long-run, is thought to be perfectly competitive.
Blanchflower et al. (1996) goes through the three possibly most favoured
explanations developed for the rent-sharing hypothesis by giving an explicit
form for each explanation in turn in a nut-shell but still with mathematical
rigour. The first model is a bargaining model in which the firm and its em-
ployees bargain over wages and the negotiated wage depends, among others,
on the firm’s profits. Each counterpart’s bargaining power decides its share
of the ”cake” and thus the magnitude of the rent sharing effect is positively
related with workers’ bargaining power.
The second model represents a mix of short-run non-competitiveness and
long-run perfect competitiveness so that the correlation between the firm’s
profits and wages it pays arises from an short-run upward-sloping labour
supply curve. The upward slope of the firm’s short-run labour supply curve
is thought to stem from rigidities in migration of labour from other less prof-
itable firms. Thus a positive demand shock, while increasing profits, causes
simultaneously an outward shift in the demand curve for labour. Therefore,
in the short run, the outward shifting labour demand curve takes the firm
up the upward sloping labour supply curve with the result that the firm’s
profits and wages rise together. Eventually, however, migration of workers
into the now better-paying firm levels down the labour supply curve facing
the firm and therefore, in this model, there is no long-run relation between
wages and profits.
The third model is based on the theory of implicit contracts according to
which wages are set to provide efficient ”insurance” against random shocks.
If both the firm and its workers are risk-aversive they end up in sharing risks
by an implicit contract which determines the way wages are adjusted when
the firm faces a random demand or technology shock affecting its profitability.
Thus in the case of a negative shock wages may even drop while a positive
shock tending to raise firm profits leads also to a rise in wages.
Nickell (1999) discuss the relation between the basic collective bargaining
models and rent sharing. He concludes that the rent sharing hypothesis can
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be given a plausible theoretical basis with relative ease within the limits
of the collective wage bargaining framework. He continues, however, that
the robustness of rent sharing effects leaves a lot to be desired. For example,
under the assumptions of Cobb-Douglas production and the constant product
and labour demand elasticities there follows an outcome in which a positive
shift in demand or in productivity leaves profits per employee unchanged and
hence also wages remain unaffected. Indeed, in order to remain on the safe
side and preserve the positive effect of firm profits on wages the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour should stay below unity.
Nickell even discusses some alternative explanations for the rent sharing
hypothesis, such as, assuming the effort function to depend positively upon
the employees’ share of firm profits in efficiency wage models7, or an explana-
tion based simply on managers’ desire to ensure themselves ”a quiet life” by
passing a part of the firm’s profits or rents further on to their subordinates.
However, as Nickell observes, the last explanation requires that managers
are, to some extent, capable of operating out of range of direct shareholder
control.
Finally, the challenge of an upward sloping labour supply curve to the
competitive labour market model is elaborated much further in Manning
(2003). He argues at length in his book that a very wide range of stan-
dard labour market phenomena is easily explained if one accepts the idea of
monopsony as a usable tool for analysing labour markets. Manning empha-
sises, however, that monopsony needs to be dealt with in the sense of the
supply of labour to an individual firm not being infinitely elastic instead of
thinking in terms of there being only one single buyer of labour. In fact,
the focal idea in Manning’s book is that once one shifts the focus on the
labour supply curve faced by an individual firm, instead of thinking in terms
of labour supply to the market as a whole, the idea of an upwards sloping
labour supply curve follows quite easily.
For our study it is interesting to note that even though Manning (2003)
argues that the standardly observed size-wage effect does not depend on the
idea that larger firms would be more profitable and their employees more suc-
cessful in extracting a share of the rents there still seems to exist a positive
correlation between firm profits and employees’ wages. He goes even further
7Danthine & Kurmann (2006) elaborate the idea further, giving it an explicit structural
form in which effort depends in part on the firm’s output per employee. Thus the model
gives a rationale for rent-sharing in the framework of efficiency wages.
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by stating that profits per employee may correlate with individual wages even
though the labour supply curve facing the firm would be completely flat and
consequently labour supply would be infinitely elastic. According to Man-
ning, however, an upward sloping labour supply curve tends to strengthen
the already existing positive relationship between individual wages and the
employer firm’s per capita profits.
When it comes to empirical studies, the earlier approach to analyse wage-
profit effects was based on the use of aggregated industry or firm-level data
in which both firm profitability and wages were included as industry- or
firm-level averages.8 A major weakness of studies based on aggregated data
is the loss of information on inter-employee variation in individual wages
and, in the case of industry data, even on inter-employer variation in firm
profits and average wages. It is evident that an ideal data set for research on
rent-sharing is formed by combining employee-level information on wages and
personal characteristics with firm-level information on profitability and other
firm characteristics. Thus the recent development of large employee-firm data
sources has enabled research to move on to new paths such as the modelling of
observed and unobserved worker characteristics.9 Our approach in this paper
will follow the last mentioned micro-econometric approach which offers the
best and most extensive opportunities to study wage-profits effects in detail.
A major controversy over empirical results concerns whether the empiri-
cally often observed correlation between a firm’s lucrativeness and wages it
pays really reflects the fact that firms do pay differently for equally produc-
tive workers or does the result only mean that we cannot control for all the
important determinants of individuals’ wages. Thus, the empirical task is
then to test whether the profit-pay effect still exists after having controlled
for such alternative explanations as the effects of unobserved and observed
worker, job and firm characteristics.
8For studies of interfirm wage differentials using firm-level data see, for example, Hil-
dreth et al. (1997) (UK), Nickell et al. (1994) (UK), Estevao & Tevlin (2003) (US) and
Haaparanta & Piekkola (1997) (Finland). For studies of interindustry wage differentials
using industry-level data see Dickens & Katz (1987a), Dickens & Katz (1987b), Krueger
& Summers (1988) and Blanchflower et al. (1996) (US).
9For studies of inter-employee wage differentials using combined employer-employee
data see Arai & Heyman (2001) and Arai (2003) (Sweden), Piekkola & Kauhanen (2003) (
Finland), Margolis & Salvanes (2001) (Norway and France), Abowd et al. (1999), (France),
Fakhfakh & FitzRoy (2004) (France), Blanchflower et al. (1996) (US, though the focus is
for the most part on industry-level analysis), Bronars & Famulari (2001) (US) and Martins
(2004) (Portugal).
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Finally, before entering the estimation stage, it needs to be complemented
that our empirical approach is meant to be neutral vis-a`-vis different theo-
retical models presented above. This means that the outspoken aim of our
empirical analysis is to find whether individual wages depend -for one or an-
other reason- on the employing firm’s lucrativeness after controlling for the
effects of other wage determining factors. In fact, not restricting our empir-
ical analysis to fit merely one of several alternative explanations put forth
above may actually add to robustness of the empirical results.
3 The Data
Before going in to the empirical estimations we present the research data
in brief. We concentrate on the Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry
firms’ white collar workers working on fulltime. We have specified ”the metal
and electrotechnical industry” to cover the monthly paid employees under the
Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry’s collective contracts for monthly
paid employees (the employer organisation TT ’s code ’40’).10 All the firms in
our data are organised and belong to the Finnish central industrial employer
organisation TT.11 This means that all unorganised (predominantly minor)
metal and electrotechnical industry firms are excluded from our analyses. A
further restriction concerning the firm sample is that the subgroup of organ-
ised metal and electrotechnical industry firms having less than 30 employees
is under-represented in our data since the data collecting instant TT does
not require obligatory response from these minor member enterprises. For
the part of larger enterprises, however, the data set covers all the organised
metal industry firms.
To concentrate on one industrial sector only may raise questions, espe-
10Conventionally there have been two (or previously three) collective contracts for this
group of salaried employees. One for the monthly paid experts and managerial profes-
sionals and another for monthly paid clerical and technical personnel. At the enterprise
side this corresponds relatively closely to the 2-digit Divisions 27 to 35 of NACE Rev. 1
classification (the statistical Nomenclature of economic activities in the European Com-
munity).
11TT and its service sector counterpart PT have recently merged into a one unified
central employer organisation (EK ). However, during the time range of the study (1995-
2001) there still were two separate central employer organisations and therefore we will
follow the terminology of that time period and use the respective abbreviations TT and
PT.
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cially, as the rent sharing hypothesis was primarily born out from empiri-
cal observations concerning inter-industry wage differences among otherwise
seemingly homogenous workers. It needs to be emphasised, however, that
the rent sharing hypothesis does not require inter-industry analysis. Instead
the main issue here is the question whether there exist a relationship between
wages and profits at the firm level while the question of inter-industry wage
differences is a minor issue in this respect. Furthermore, concentration on a
more homogenous group of workers adds to the statistical reliability of the
estimated rent sharing effects since many sources for heterogenity have been
controlled for from the start.
Another detail maybe needing explanation concerning the used data is
the choice of the industry. There are three major reasons for concentrating
exclusively on the metal and electrotechnical industry. Firstly, the metal and
electrotechnical industry forms one of central industries in Finland. Secondly,
it is also very open to international competition and therefore the need for
the firms operating in the industry to adapt to changes in economic environ-
ment, and consequently, in profitability is essential. Thirdly, the quality of
the employee data collected from the metal and electrotechnical firms is of
guaranteed good quality.
Lastly, the decision to use monthly paid employees only may need a few
words to explain also. There are two major reasons for this choice. Firstly,
as already mentioned, concentration on monthly paid employees only and
leaving hourly paid workers outside the scope of the study increases the
possibility to isolate the effects of profits on pay more effectively from other
wage determining factors. Secondly monthly paid employees, contrary to
hourly paid employees, have usually a fairly fixed number of regular hours
per month making it more easy to isolate the variation in wages due to
changes in monthly hours (such as overtime hours) from other factors.
The analysed data set has been formed by linking three different data
sources from the years 1995 to 2001. The two first data sources consist of
two employee-level wage statistics: the Finnish Structure of Earnings Statis-
tics of Statistics Finland and the white collar industrial employees’ wage
statistics collected by TT. These two data sources contain information a) on
wages, working hours and other employee-level items and b) on the employer
firm’s items; such as information on firms’ employee numbers, industry etc.
The third data source is the financial statement data collected by Statistics
Finland containing enterprise-specific information, among others, metal and
electrotechnical industry firms’ profitability. For each year 1995-2001 these
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three extensive and on yearly basis collected data sources have first been
linked together by using employees’ and enterprises’ identity codes and fi-
nally a longitudinal data set has been formed by combining the combined
annual data sets together. All in all, this means that the data set forms
a matched employer-employee data set including information on both firms
and workers.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Multivariate models without controls for
unobserved employee and firm effects
As said, we will run repeated estimations for each model specification us-
ing the same set of independent variables but altering the definition of the
dependent wage variable. Thus, in successive estimations of each particu-
lar model the wage specification ranges from a simple base wage to the one
comprising - in addition to basic wage - benefits in kind, supplements for
shift and Sunday work and earnings for overtime hours, performance-related
payments and (for the years 1998-2001) direct profit-related payments.
As the starting point for the empirical analysis we run first a static mul-
tivariate model containing only controls for observable effects:
lnwit = δ + pij(i,t)ρ0 + x
′
itβ + u
′
iη + v
′
j(i,t)ρ1 + q
′
j(i,t)tρ2 + p
′
tτ + it. (1)
where wit is person i ’s wage in period t and pij(i,t) measures per capita
profitability of firm j in which person i works during the period t. Note that
wage is defined as a logarithmic transformation. Since profits are in levels our
empirical model specification is of semi-logarithmic form. Further the term
x′it is a transposed vector of observed time-varying individual characteristics
(e.g. person’s age) and β is the corresponding coefficients vector. u′i is a
transpose vector of time-invariant individual characteristics (e.g. person’s
sex). η is the vector of effects associated with the time-invariant individual
characteristics. v′j(i,t) is a transpose vector of time-invariant firm character-
istics12 (e.g. industry) and ρ1 is the corresponding coefficients vector. q
′
j(i,t)t
12Not represented in our estimation specifications.
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is a transpose vector of time-varying firm characteristics (e.g. capital in-
tensity13) and ρ2 is the corresponding coefficients vector. p
′
t is a transpose
vector containing time-specific effects (e.g. indicators of business cycles and
sectoral shocks, indices measuring collective wage increases or simply year
dummies 14) and τ contains the corresponding coefficients. Finally, errors
are specified with it.
But before going into regression models we look at descriptive statis-
tics of salaries and profitability variables in table 1. After matching the
monthly paid employees under the Finnish metal and electrotechnical indus-
try’s collective contract for monthly paid employees with annual firm-level
profit information the number of employees having the information of the
employer firm’s profits (operating profits/value added) and thereby being es-
timable within the framework of model 1 amounted to 296625 (1995-2001)
and 183920 (1998-2001). Since profit-related payments are available only
from 1998 onwards we will present - even at the risk of added confusion - two
different sets of key figures for the salary concepts 1, 2, 3 and 4. The first set
refers to the full time range 1995-2001 (296625 observations) and the second
set is calculated from the limited period of 1998-2001 (183920 observations).
Concerning mean salaries it can now be seen that performance-related
payments make the major difference. When compared to the salary con-
cept 2 (basic salary+benefits in kind+compensation for exceptional working
time) the inclusion of performance-related payments (concept 3) increases
mean salary by well over three to almost four percent depending on whether
calculated from the overall period 1995-2001 or from the limited period 1998-
2001. Instead the addition of profit-related payments on top of that (salary
concept 5) leads to hardly any net increase in mean salary.15 The net effect
of overtime payments is about one and half percentage points. However,
as overtime payments are paid as compensation for increased labour input
they need not be linked to rent sharing even if they were correlated with
13This vector should actually include per capita profits pij(i,t)t but as this forms our
main object of interest the profits term is presented separately.
14Our decision to include year dummies was determined by the fact that an essential
part of wage increases in Finland regularly takes place through collectively negotiated wage
increases. Apart from year dummies we experimented also with an index by Statistics
Finland measuring collective wage increases and the regression results turned out to be
similar to the ones based on year dummies. These results are available from the author
on request.
15Since profit-related payments are available only from 1998 onwards the comparison
here refers to the mean salaries calculated from the limited period 1998-2001.
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profitability. Of course, none of the observations above says anything about
whether and into which degree even base salaries are affected by firm profits.
Another interesting finding is that - independently how measured - prof-
its are much more volatile than wages. While the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by mean) varies between 0.33-0.34 for salaries
the same measure is 0.80 for real per-employee value added and rises up to
1.32 when profitability is measured with real annual per capita operating
profits. The significant volatility of per capita profits means that rent shar-
ing effects may in fact affect employees’ labour earnings much stronger than
what regression model estimates might hint at first glance. We will consider
this issue in more detail later on in this study.
In table 2 we see results of regressing monthly wages on annual per-
employee profits (defined in terms of real operating profits, or alternatively,
real value added) plus on an extensive set of employee and employer char-
acteristics16. In models 1a-6a the profitability variable refers to real per
employee operating profits 17while in models 1b-6b firm’s profitability is mea-
sured by real per employee value added.
In regard to the dependent variable, models 1a and 1b represent a re-
gression with base wage as dependent variable, in models 2a and 2b the
base wage variable is augmented with benefits in kind and extra compensa-
tion for shift and Sunday work. In models 3a and 3b the wage variable is
further augmented with performance-related payments. The wage specifica-
tion in models 4a and 4b is that of the models 3a and 3b augmented with
monthly overtime payments. Excluding over-time earnings but including in-
stead profit-related payments (calculated per month) leads us to the wage
specifications in models 5a and 5b. Finally, by adding over-time payments
back to the pay concepts of models 5a and 5b we obtain our most extensive
wage specification in models 6a and 6b.
In all models the dependent variable is in natural logarithms while the
16Along with profitability all the models contain the following independent variables:
employer firm’s real capital assets per employee; regular monthly working hours; age and
its square; seniority within the current company and its square and cube; educational level
(five categories); occupation (74 categories in accordance with TT ’s own classification);
and six year dummies for years 1996-2001. When the wage specification contains even
overtime earnings (models 4a, 4b, 6a and 6b) monthly overtime hours are included amongst
the explanatory variables.
17Income due to sales of tangible capital goods is excluded from our definition of oper-
ating profits. Therefore this measure of ’net’ operating profits plus personal costs equals
value added.
13
independent profit variable is in levels enabling us to include even negative
values in the analysis. All wage specifications are defined in real terms (1995
e) and as per month. Per capita profits are also in real terms (1995 1000 e)
but, in contrast to monthly wages, profits are counted on yearly basis.
Firms’ profitability appears to have a significant positive effect on white-
collar employees’ monthly salaries. The estimated wage elasticities with
respect to per-head operating profits (models 1a-6a) range from 0.023 to
0.036.18 And the estimated wage elasticities with respect to per-head value
added (models 1b-6b) range between 0.039 and 0.062. Estimated elasticities
for base wage models 1a and 1b are 0.023 and 0.039 respectively.
Thus even base wages seem to vary with firms’ profitability. Inclusion of
benefits in kind and working time supplements adds nothing to the estimated
magnitude of shared rents. Instead performance-related based payments turn
out to be of primary importance leading the elasticity to rise up to its prac-
tically highest estimated values, i.e. 0.036 and 0.060 for model 3a and 3b,
respectively. The inclusion of over-time payments or even profit-related pay-
ments leads to no further change.
The divergent roles of performance-related payments vs. profit-related
payments are especially interesting for the emergence and magnitude of
shared rents. A clear-cut conclusion would be to think the company-level
profitability is not a major determinant of an individual wage so that the
sub-company level (individual/working unit/workplace etc.) performance
dominates worker-specific wage determination instead. But the valid inter-
pretation is not necessarily quite so unambiguous.
Firstly, and as mentioned earlier, information on profit-related payments
is available only from 1998 onwards. The reason for this is that the data col-
lector, Finnish central industrial employer organisation TT, did not require
this information from its member enterprises earlier. However, it is con-
ceivable that firms may have even earlier reported profit-related payments
together with performance-related payments without making a clear distinc-
tion between the two concepts.19 In any case, from table 1 it appears that
18For a semi-logarithmic model the elasticity is calculated by multiplying the estimated
coefficient of profitability effect by the average of per employee profits.
19This optional reservation has also come up in our discussions with TT’s wage statis-
tics experts. In particular, as it is often the case that the payments under the heading
”performance-related” are actually being based on a combination of sub-company-level
operational targets and - albeit to a lesser degree - overall company-level profitability.
Therefore the line between ”performance-related” and ”profit-related” bonuses has the
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during the years 1998-2001 profit-related payments raised the average salary
per month by only 2.13 euros (2503.89 vs. 2506.02 euros) while the impact of
performance-related payments during the same period was of a totally differ-
ent magnitude raising the average salary by 94.30 euros per month (2409.59
vs. 2503.89 euros).
Another potential reason for the minor impact of profit-related payments
on individual salaries is the delay in the payment of these kinds of profits
related items. Typically, firms measure profits on a yearly basis and the
actual decisions concerning the corresponding payments are made only after
the accounting period has ended. This means that payments based explicitly
on profitability are generally paid during the following year after they are
actually earned. This means that even lagged profits should be included in
estimations. Evidently, the omission of lagged profits leads to the omitted
variable problem resulting in biased estimates even for the part of non-lagged
rent sharing effects. Therefore the impact of profits related payments will be
fully assessed only after having added lagged profits as independent variables
to the estimated model. We will analyse the potential impact of lagged pay-
profits effects in more detail later on in this study.
It is also noteworthy to observe that rent sharing effects seem to be larger
in the case of value added than in the case of operational profits. This is
exactly what can be expected if operational profits suffer from endogeneity.
In this case the use of operational profits as a profitability measure leads
to downward biased estimates of rent sharing coefficients.20 One way to
try to detect potential endogeneity bias is to use value added as a parallel
profitability measure.
Finally, in order to test the impact of estimation periods we ran auxiliary
model estimations restricted to years 1998-2001 only using the wage concepts
3 and 4 as dependent variables.21 The estimated pay-profits effects from
the latter period turned out to be similar to the ones estimated from the
flavour more of a gradation than of a mutual exclusiveness.
20Even though the sizes of rent sharing coefficient estimates remain fairly close to each
other independently of the applied profitability measure the fact that real per capita added
is much larger than real per capita operational profits on average means that the use of
value added produces much larger rent sharing effects in absolute terms. In other words,
there is a sort of scaling issue here so that operational profits not having larger estimated
rent sharing coefficients compared to those of value added suggests that operational profits
produce downward biased rent sharing coefficient estimates.
21The estimates are accessible on request from the author.
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overall period 1995-2001. Thus it seems that the relation between wages and
profitability remained unchanged during the period 1998-2001 compared to
the years 1995-1997 even though a significant increase in real per capita
profits took place during the latter period (cf. table 3).
The results of table 2 bear well comparison with the magnitude of inter-
national rents effects estimates based on corresponding multivariate models.
Looking first at Nordic labour markets Arai & Heyman (2001) and Arai
(2003) using corresponding model specifications presented elasticities in the
range of 0.009 to 0.015 for Swedish nonagricultural private sector employees
in 1991 and 1995 when profits were measured as four to five years averages
of current and lagged profits per employee. However, Arai & Heyman (2004)
using data of Swedish private sector employees combined with simultaneous
annual per employee profits for 2000 arrives at the elasticity value of 0.002
only. Using a corresponding model specification and data on the manufac-
turing sectors Margolis & Salvanes (2001) report an elasticity of 0.01 for
Norway.
Looking at continental labour markets (often regarded as an intermedi-
ate form between the Nordic and the Anglo-American labour market models)
Margolis & Salvanes (2001) report an elasticity of 0.002 for a French manu-
facturing sectors data using a multivariate model specification. Correspond-
ingly, using matched employee-firm data of French manufacturing Fakhfakh
& FitzRoy (2002) report elasticities from 0.014 up to 0.019 for basic hourly
wage and between 0.03 and 0.04 for total hourly earnings when profits are
measured with the average of preceding three year’s positive per-employee
operating profits. When profitability is measured with the average of preced-
ing three year’s positive per-employee value added the elasticities rise up to
0.07 and 0.12 for basic hourly wages and total hourly earnings, respectively.
Martins (2004) uses Portuguese matched employee-employer panel data
for manufacturing sector 1993-95 and shows hourly wage elasticities w.r.t.
profits per worker between -0.002 and 0.013 for multivariate models. How-
ever, after having added the wage bill per worker to ”net profits per worker”
elasticities rise up to the range between 0.08. and 0.22. Martins concludes
that small and even negative elasticities of the ”net profits per worker” mea-
sure may testify of the fact that profitability measures from which even labour
costs are subtracted suffer from endogeneity resulting in downward biased
rent sharing estimates (higher wages, ceteris paribus, translate into lower
profits).
Finally, as an example of the more disaggregated Anglo-American labour
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market system Blanchflower et al. (1996) estimate short-time elasticities
ranging between 0.037 and 0.040 (weekly respectively hourly earnings) for
full-year full-time worker data of U.S. manufacturing industry 1964-1986.
Regarding the estimated rent sharing effects from other countries above
and comparing these with our own estimates a few remarks need to be made.
Firstly, the studies show that magnitudes of rent sharing effects vary signifi-
cantly from one study to another. Substantial variation in estimated results
underlines even more the significance of defining the estimated model speci-
fications as well as the included profitability and earnings variables in detail.
Secondly, the sample of employees and industrial sectors is crucial when
thinking how representative the results are with respect to the whole pri-
vate sector workforce. Therefore, of course, when comparing our estimates
with estimates from international studies based usually on a more or less
representative sample of the entire private sector (or at least manufactur-
ing sector) employees one needs to keep in mind that our estimation sample
consists solely of metal and electrotechnical industry white-collar employees
and therefore it is not representative for the whole Finnish private sector
nor even for the manufacturing sector alone. Furthermore, as the sample of
white-collar workers represents the more educated part of the private sector
workforce and simultaneously covers such modern high-tech industries as the
electronics industry it can be assumed that the estimated rent sharing effects
are not representative in terms of their magnitude either. In fact, they are
likely to be more significant than elsewhere in the Finnish private sector (cf.
Piekkola (1999)).
Thirdly, a mere fact of finding statistically significant wage-profits effects
and, moreover, these being more or less of the same dimension as the esti-
mated effects from previous studies does not, per se, imply that rent-sharing
needs to have any major effect on the size of individual wages. In absolute
terms, the size of the estimated wage-profit effects means simply that at the
average level of per capita operational profits of 52591.37 euros an increase
by 1000 euros in annual per capita operational profits leads to an increase
in monthly wage by 1.00 to 1.68 euros depending on the wage definition.22
Correspondingly, a one percent rise in annual per capita value added starting
from its average level of 89702.23 e leads to an increase in monthly salary
by 1.01 to 1.75 euros.23 Of course, by themselves, these hardly form any
22This is calculated as ρˆ0 × w¯ where ρˆ0 is the estimated rent sharing parameter and w¯
is the mean monthly wage.
23Corresponding values can be derived for France and Norway using the results of Mar-
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exhaustive indicators for the potential significance of rent sharing vis-a`-vis
the size of monthly wages. Instead in order to clarify this issue we need to
take a closer look on the average magnitude and volatility of profits.
One way to assess the importance of shared rents in this respect is to
follow Margolis & Salvanes (2001) who compared the average contribution
of pay-profits effects with the average wages net of this contribution. The
idea of using this measure is that it shows directly how much higher wages
are due to shared profits as compared to the case of no rent sharing taking
place. After combining the estimated ρ0-coefficient (cf. model 1) of table 2
with the per-capita profits of table 1 and adapting the measure by Margolis
& Salvanes (2001) (hereafter referred as ”the Margolis-Salvanes measure”)
to the semi-logarithmic model it can be seen in table 2 that when operating
profits are used as profitability measure rent sharing raises wages by 2.32-3.68
% as compared to the average wages with no rent sharing effects present.24 If
profitability is measured by value added the corresponding Margolis-Salvanes
measures range between 4.03 and 6.37 %. Thus rent-sharing has clearly a
non-ignorable effect on white-collar employees’ wages in the Finnish metal
and electrotechnical industry.25
The comparison above, however, pays no attention to the year-to-year
volatility or inter-firm dispersion of profits which both are focal factors when
evaluating the impact of rent sharing on wages. A closer look at annual
profitability figures (see table 3) reveals that over the observed time span
1995-2001 the yearly average of real per employee operating profits more
than tripled in the Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry and the yearly
coefficients of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation of the real per
employee operating profits to the mean of the same measure) varied be-
tween 84.1% (1997) and 150.9% (1999). These figures show that profitability
changes substantially over time and there is significant inter-firm dispersion
golis & Salvanes (2001).
24In difference to Margolis & Salvanes (2001) we adapt their measure to semi-logarithmic
models. The measure can now be defined as (exp(ρˆ0 × p¯i)− 1) where ρˆ0 is the estimate of
profit-pay coefficient and p¯i is the (arithmetic) mean per-employee profit. Note that the
percentage refers now to the geometric average instead of the arithmetic one.
25Margolis & Salvanes (2001), using a multivariate model, reported corresponding es-
timates of 0.21 % and 1.00 % for France and Norway, respectively. On the other hand,
Oswald (1996) using estimation results of Abowd & Lemieux (1993) for Canada with in-
strumented profits ended up with a 28% wage premium created by rents as calculated
from the mean wage after deducting the premium. Oswald (1996) admits, however, that
there is likely to be measurement error in quasi-rents.
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too.
In this respect, a more interesting approach to assess the importance of
shared rents as a component of total salary is to use a measure by Richard
Lester (1952). Lester’s ”range of pay” compares the spread of wages due to
the dispersion of profits26 with the mean wage.27 The estimates of Lester’s
measure in table 2 indicate that the four standard deviations’ dispersion
(”range”) in per-employee operating profits led to a 12.1-19.1 percent spread
in wages in proportion to the monthly paid employees’ mean wage in the
Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry 1995-2001. And similar calcula-
tions based on real per-head value added instead led to a spread between 12.7
and 19.8. 28 These estimates are significant even in international perspec-
tive. Calculating Lester’s range of pay values using cross-section multivariate
estimations by Arai & Heyman (2001) for the Swedish private sector implies
that the wage inequality due to the spread of profits ranged between 5.4-7.3
% and between 3.0-4.3 % of mean wages in 1991 and 1995 respectively. Ac-
cording to Blanchflower et al. (1996) the same measure applied to workers
and firms in the U.S. manufacturing industry matched employee-firm sample
gave the result that 12.2 % of the distribution of weekly earnings and 11.3 %
of that of hourly wages is being originated in rent sharing. However, when
using firm-level data and a dynamic model specification Blanchflower et al.
(1996) ends up with a long-run Lester’s range estimate of 24 per cent.
Another measure designed to assess the magnitude of shared rents for
total wages is presented by Oswald (1996). The idea is to analyse how large
a share of the dispersion of wages is to be accounted for the dispersion in
shared profits.29 When using operating profit as profitability measure it ap-
pears from table 2 that, depending on the wage concept, 8.8 to 13.6 percent
of the standard deviation of salaries could be attributable for shared prof-
its. When measuring profitability with value added Oswald’s measure goes
26Using four standard deviations of profits as the width of the distribution of profits.
27Lester’s range of pay is calculated using the formula εw,pi × 4×σpip¯i where εw,pi is the
elasticity of wages (w) with respect to profits (pi), σpi is the standard deviation of profits
and p¯i is the mean profit.
28Due to the adapted semi-logarithmic model specification the larger wage-profit elas-
ticities linked to value added than to operational profits are now counterbalanced by the
larger averages of per capita value added.
29For a log-linear model Oswald’s measure can be defined as ρ0 σpi×wσw where ρ0 is the
coefficient of the profit-pay effect as estimated using a semi-logarithmic model like the
equation 1 (wages defined as natural logarithms and profits as levels), σpi is the standard
deviation of profits and σw the standard deviation of wages.
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from 9.2 percent up to 14.3 percent depending on the wage concept. In in-
ternational comparison these values do not fall behind either. Using linear
models Margolis & Salvanes (2001) presented Oswald’s measure estimates of
2.56 % for France and 9.88 % for Norway. Oswald (1996), however, mentions
that previous research has produced shares ranging from 24% to 70% for the
United States and from 4% to 25% for United Kingdom.
As a conclusion of the estimation results using the basic multivariate
static regression model 1 as our benchmark case it seems that profits and
firms’ ability to pay do play an undisputable role in monthly paid employ-
ees’ wage determination in the Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry.
However, the analysis so far forms only a starting point for a more detailed
analysis. The rest of the paper will deal with a couple of analytical exten-
sions. We will first consider the potential omitted variable bias due to the
absence of controls for unobserved time-invariant firm and employee effects.
After that we will consider the question whether firm profitability affects
wages exclusively during the same year or whether there are lagged effects
too. In the latter case we will also compare the magnitude of lagged effects
with the immediate ones.
4.2 Adding controls for unobserved firm and person
characteristics and for lagged effects
Our static multivariate benchmark model estimations showed that profitabil-
ity affects positively Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry salaries.
Profits seem to affect even base wages and therefore the correlation of in-
dividual wages with the employer firm’s profitability cannot be attributed
merely to changing labour inputs (e.g. overtime working hours) or straight
performance- or profits related wage components. On the other hand, the
inclusion of performance-related components magnifies substantially the ob-
served pay-profits effects.
But the multivariate static model offer only a first scratch for a rent shar-
ing analysis. Thus, the next issue is to analyse how robust the preliminary
findings are when we adopt more detailed specifications. As a first step we
still continue with a static model but modify our model specifications with
a view to controlling unobserved time-invariant personal and firm effects.
The following model specification 2 contains now both observed and un-
observed employee and firm effects:
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lnwit =δ + pij(i,t)ρ0 + x
′
itβ + αi + u
′
iη + φj(i,t) + v
′
j(i,t)ρ1 + q
′
j(i,t)tρ2+
p′tτ + it.
(2)
In the equation 2 above αi stands for the unobservable personal hetero-
geneity while φj(i,t) captures the unobserved firm heterogeneity associated
with person i ’s employer firm j in period t. The rest of the parameter and
variable symbols is defined as in model 1.
A detailed model such as model 2 entails, however, serious practical dif-
ficulties when trying to estimate it. Using unrestricted OLS leads to huge
design matrices which need to be inverted in order to reach least squares
estimates for all the parameters of the model. Abowd et al. (1999) present
statistical methods they call ’conditional’ methods which offer approximative
solutions to the computationally infeasible full least squares estimation of all
the parameters of the model 2. Margolis & Salvanes (2001) and in Finland
Piekkola & Kauhanen (2003) have followed that approach but since the key
interest in our study is the profits-pay effect we will follow another route
suggested by Abowd et al. (1999).
The solution is simply to estimate a first-differenced (cf. Abowd et al.
(1999)) or, alternatively, as deviations from individual means specified ver-
sion of model 2 restricting the calculation of first-differences or mean devi-
ations to each separate firm-individual cell (each cell consisting of the ob-
servations of the same person (i) as long as she/he stays in the same firm
(j ) between the two subsequent years (i.e. j(i,t)=j(i,t-1)). We will follow
the latter approach. Using deviations from individual means wipes out the
individual effects while restricting the calculation of each individual mean
to contain only observations in the service of the same employer wipes out
firm-specific time-constant effects. Thus our approach offers a way to bypass
the computational difficulties linked with the full least squares solution. On
the other hand, however, this is achieved at the expense of being unable
to estimate and identify explicitly time-invariant individual and firm effects
(i.e. αi and φj(i,t)). Neither can we estimate any other time-invariant effects.
But, despite these shortcomings we still achieve our three most important
objectives both with the first-differenced or within-individual mean differ-
enced versions of model 2 as long as each separate differencing or calculation
of means is accomplished using only observations of the same worker staying
in the same firm. First, we can implicitly control for all observed and unob-
served time-constant individual and firm-specific effects. Second, observable
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time-variant effects will be explicitly included and therefore also separately
estimated in the model. And finally, we obtain a robust and consistent OLS
estimate for the wage-profits effect.
Model specification 3 represents the mean-differenced version of the full
model 2 and the deviations from means are calculated within each employee-
employing firm (i -j ) combination.30 Note especially, that even the persons
changing employer will remain in the estimation sample as long as the new
employer firm is an estimation sample firm too. The individual-firm mean-
differenced version is chosen instead of the first-differenced version because
the deviations from means transformation preserves and makes use of a larger
number of observations in the estimations (e.g. fitting the model in first
differences ignores all the 1995 year’s observations). As noted before, the
use of first- as well as mean-differenced transformations eliminates all time-
constant effects from the model. Still, any time-constant effect is controlled
for in the model specification 3 which means that the estimation bias of
estimated parameters due to omission of time-invariant effects from the basic
model 1 is now eliminated. Yet, of course, only the explicit inclusion of any
other previously omitted time-variant effect can eliminate the corresponding
bias.
lnwit − (lnwi − lnw) =δ + {pij(i,t)t − (p¯ij(i,t) − p¯i)}ρ0+
{xit − (x¯i − x¯)}′β+
{qj(i,t)t − (qj(i,t) − q)}′ρ2+
{pt − (pi − p)}′τ+
{it − (¯i − ¯)}
(3)
In table 4 we see results of estimating multivariate mean-differenced re-
30In the specification 3, actually, total sample means (lnw, p¯i, x¯, q and ¯) are first
subtracted from the corresponding firm-employee combinations means (lnwi, p¯ij(i,t), x¯i,
qj(i,t) and ¯i) and these differences then are subtracted from employee-level values. In
this way even the constant term will be preserved in estimations. Note, however, that the
estimated intercept coefficient encompasses now, in addition to the actual constant term,
the total sample means of individual and firm-specific unobserved effects plus the effects
of the total sample means of all time-constant observed firm and worker characteristics.
Note furthermore that the specification 3 covers even unbalanced panels. For the case of
time dummies belonging to the set of cross section-constant but time-variant variables p′
this implicates that their individual-specific means vary across individuals explaining the
subindex of pi′. The transformation, however, has no effect on the estimated τ parameters.
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gression models of type 3 above for the same six different wage specifications
and the two per-head profitability measures as before (see table 2). Again,
each wage concept generates statistically significant estimates of rent shar-
ing coefficients. But when it comes to the consequences of controlling for
unobserved time-invariant employee and firm characteristics the comparison
between tables 2 and 4 shows that the controls lead to a significant decrease
in all the different indicators measuring the economic significance of rent
sharing except in those of the wage concept 5.
Looking at any of the four indicators (the wage-profits elasticity, Margolis-
Salvanes measure, Lester’s range and Oswald’s measure) it can be seen that
the most prominent decreases fall on the two most elementary wage concepts
(models 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b) which show decreases by one quarter as compared
to the corresponding indicators in table 2. This means that a significant
part of the observed (partial) correlation between basic wages and profits
disappears once we add controls for all the time-constant unobserved firm-
and employee-specific effects. One possible explanation for this could be that
higher basic wages are paid in more profitable firms in part simply because
these employ more skilled and thus more productive workers.
While the aforementioned explanation leans closely on the idea of un-
observed employee-specific effects there is another option inclining rather to-
wards efficiency wage theories and unobserved firm-specific effects. Namely, if
a firm chooses to pay more than the prevailing wage level in order to enhance
its employees’ productivity this is likely to produce unobserved firm-specific
effects potentially correlated both with profits and wages. Thus unless be-
ing controlled, these effects might produce upward bias in pay-profits effects
which would explain the observed decrease in rent sharing coefficients. Of
course, both these explanations may apply simultaneously the only prereq-
uisite being that the unobserved effects are time-invariant.
A similar, though quantitatively smaller, pattern of decreasing profit
coefficients is repeated even for the broader wage concepts 3 (containing
performance-related payments) and 4 (even over-time earnings being in-
cluded) after controlling for unobserved fixed effects. The wage concept 5
seems to be the most robust of all the wage definitions in this respect. It
appears that even after controlling all unobserved time-invariant firm and
employee effects on top of a wide set of time-variant effects the elasticity
and the other estimates remain roughly intact. This shows up to the extent
that once unobserved fixed effects are taken into account the wage concept 5
adduces the largest response vis-a`-vis both the profitability measures. This
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is no surprise, rather the contrary, but the outcome emerges only after hav-
ing controlled both the employee- and firm-specific unobserved effects. The
result emphasises, once more, the importance of detailed micro-econometric
model specification.
Finally, when overtime earnings are added back (i.e. the wage concept 6)
all the indicators drop even below those of the wage concepts 3 and 4. This
might suggest that overtime earnings per an overtime hour are relatively
unresponsive to fluctuations in profits (cf. table 1) which, combined with
the semi-logarithmic model specification and the fact that the wage concepts
6a and 6b possess the largest averages of all the wage concepts, would then
explain the decrease of wage-profit elasticities.
Again, Margolis-Salvanes measures show net effects of rent sharing on
monthly salary as a percentual proportion of the average monthly salary
without rent sharing. Now when operating profits are used as a profitability
measure rent sharing raises wages by 1.72-3.43 % (cf. 2.32-3.68 % in table
2). If profitability is measured by value added the corresponding Margolis-
Salvanes measures range between 3.01 and 5.89 % (4.03-6.37 % in table 2).31
As said, irrespective of a used profitability measure the largest wage-
profit responses are now connected to the wage concept 5 which contains
even the pay components related directly to the firm’s overall profitability.
Still it needs to be emphasised that, in absolute terms, the profit-related
components do not add much extra into the overall picture of rent sharing:
for example, the Margolis-Salvanes measure estimates for salary concepts 3
and 4 are not significantly smaller. For the magnitude of shared rents the
role of performance-related payments is still by far the most important (cf.
the difference between wage concepts 2 and 3 using any of the indicators).
Thus it seems that there are unobserved worker and firm characteris-
tics contributing positively to individual wages and therefore unless being
controlled for they will produce upwards biased rent sharing estimates. An
apparent reason for the rent sharing indicators of wage specification 5 to
31On the whole, these last-estimated margolis-Salvanes measures correspond fairly
closely with estimates from international studies. Margolis & Salvanes (2001), using a
multivariate model with instrumented per-employee profits and regressors consisting of a
large set of observable firm and worker characteristics plus fixed worker and firm effects,
reported estimates of 1.10 % and 0.61 % for France and Norway, respectively. A simi-
lar specification by Martins (2004) produced estimates of 0.66 % for instrumented real
gross per-employee profits (i.e. operating profits) and 4.01 % for instrumented real net
per-employee profits (i.e. value added).
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remain the most constant amongst all the different wage specifications is
that profit-related bonuses, by definition, do not not depend on unobserved
individual-specific characteristics but instead relate explicitly to the employer
firm’s overall profitability.
When it comes to the comparison of explanatory powers (goodness of
fit) of various model specifications the comparison of the mean differenced
model specifications with the basic multivariate specifications encompasses
severe ambiguities and difficulties. At first sight, it could be thought that
the R2s of the basic model estimations (table 2) could be compared with
the ”within” R2s of the firm-worker mean-deviated models (table 4).32 But
this is not a viable option either since in the case of the basic models the
dependent variable is defined in logarithmic levels while in the case firm-
worker mean-differenced model specifications the dependent variable is de-
fined as deviations from the differences between the firm-worker specific and
the total sample means. Therefore one cannot straightforwardly compare
the basic model R-squares with any of the three different R-squares of the
mean-deviated models.
Instead comparison is possible between same kinds of ”within” R2s.33
Maybe the most interesting observation in this respect concerns the sharp
drop in the within R-squares when the directly on profits based payments
are added in to salaries (concepts 5 and 6). The reason might be connected
with the fact that all lagged wage-profits effects have been excluded from our
estimated models so far. Especially, as the decrease in R-squares happens
to coincide with the inclusion of firm-level profitability related payments the
final pecuniary amount of which cannot be determined by the firm before it
knows its annual profit. Therefore, as an accounting period continues often
past the end of the year, the observed decline in the wage-profits effects
may simply be due to the fact that payments based on the firm’s overall
profitability will not be paid during the same year they are actually earned
but instead in the course of the following year. Thus in order to capture
these effects lagged per-capita-profits need to be included in the estimation
32The ”within” R2s being estimated using deviations from the individual-firm specific
means.
33If the estimated mean differenced model were simply (yit−yi) = (x′it−x¯′i)β+(it− ¯i)
then the three different ”within” R2s could be defined more formally as follows. R2
within would refer to the prediction equation (yˆit − yˆi) = (x′it − x¯′i)βˆ; R2 between to
the ”prediction” equation yˆi = δˆ + x¯′iβˆ; and R
2 overall to the ”prediction” equation
yˆit = δˆ + x′itβˆ.
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models. We will return to this issue in the latter part of the study.
Finally, the use of value added as an alternative profitability measure
generated again without exception larger estimated rent sharing effects than
those based on operational profits. This observation weakens the potential
endogeneity problem as value added is likely to be more immune to potential
downward endogeneity bias in rent sharing estimates than operational profits.
As a conclusion, the most interesting results can be summed up. Firstly,
even after taking into account the unobserved time-constant individual and
firm heterogeneity the evidence of rent sharing remains feasible. Secondly,
performance-related payments emerge still as the most important factors
for the magnitude of shared rents. Thirdly, compared to basic wages, the
company-level profitability related payments appear now proportionally more
responsive to changes in firm profitability. Fourthly, for the part of the basic
wage concepts of models 1a-2a and 1b-2b it seems that a large part of the ini-
tially observed rent sharing effects arising from the basic models estimations
was actually due to higher basic wage employees being in possession of more
well paid individual characteristics or simply working in higher paying firms
or occupations. Finally, the use of value added as an alternative profitability
measure lends again further credence to the observed results as being more
robust to endogeneity bias.
Up to now we have concentrated entirely on simultaneous pay-profits
effects. Still, it is quite easy to think various mechanisms through which
rent sharing may have delayed effects so that changes in pay need not nec-
essarily take place instantly during the same year the firm’s profitability
changes. Therefore we conclude the empirical analyses by asking whether
the wages depend solely on current profits or are there effects that are due
to previous years’ profitability? The answer to the question is started to
seek by adding a one-period lagged per employee profits term (pij(i,t)t−1) into
the mean-differenced estimation model 3. The model specification is conse-
quently now:
lnwit − (lnwi − lnw) =δ + {pij(i,t)t − (p¯ij(i,t) − p¯i)}ρ0+
{pij(i,t)t−1 − (p¯ij(i,t) − p¯i)}ρ1+
{xit − (x¯i − x¯)}′β+
{qj(i,t)t − (qj(i,t) − q)}′ρ2+
{it − (¯i − ¯)}
(4)
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The model specification 4 represents the familiar distributed lag model:
firm j ’s per capita profits have now also lagged effect(s) on person i ’s wage
but there is no lagged dependent variable on the right side of the estimation
equation. Otherwise the notation is identical to that of equation 3. Note
that we are now primarily interested of long-run relations and the combined
long-run effect of current and one year lagged profits can be modelled as
ρ = ρ0 + ρ1.
In table 5 we see OLS estimation results of mean-differenced distributed
lag wage models with controls for observed and unobserved employee and
individual effects as well as for current and one period lagged pay-profit
effects. Except for one-year lagged profitability effects, in all other respects
the specifications are identical to static multivariate models of table 4 above.
All estimated current period (ρˆ0) and one-year lagged (ρˆ1) pay-profit ef-
fects are statistically significant at 0.1% significance level in each of the twelve
models. When comparing the long run effect estimates (= ρˆ0 + ρˆ1) of table
5 with the sole current period effect estimates (ρˆ0) of table 4 these do not
differ much from each other for the part of basic wage specifications (1a, 1b,
2a and 2b). Instead in the case of models 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b the
distributed lag models produced 3.1 to 13.5 per cent larger (long term) pay-
profit estimates compared to the sole current period estimates. The biggest
change by 13.5 % concerns wage concept 3.
In table 5 even the monthly base salary shows a clear dependence on
the firm’s lucrativeness. The addition of benefits in kind or supplements for
shift and Sunday work does not alter the estimated effects. Instead, and in
line with the previous static multivariate models findings, the inclusion of
performance-related payments leads to the doubling of long-run pay-profits
effects. Instead augmenting wage specification 3 with monthly over-time
earnings or explicit company-level profits related payments does not affect
the size of long-run profits-effects on pay. An interesting outcome is also that
wage specification 5 generates now the strongest estimated one-year lagged
effects. This supports the view mentioned before that profitability-related
payments are not necessarily always being paid within the same year as they
are actually earned.
Even though the inclusion of lagged profits proved to be fully justified
it does not alter the ”big picture” of previous findings; salaries seem still to
vary in line with firm profitability independently of whether this is measured
with operating profits or with value added. Thus the findings derived from
the static models previously achieve further support from the distributed
27
lag pay-profit models estimations. These dynamic models estimations offer,
however, a more detailed view of rent sharing and the process through which
profits may affect an employee’s total labour earnings as well as its separate
components.
The conclusions remain fairly similar when looking at pay-profit elastic-
ities. Again, models 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b produce elasticities that are propor-
tionally from 8-9 up to 13-14 percent larger than the ones based on the static
mean-deviated models. The rest of the models produce elasticities closer
to those of table 4. The same conclusion holds for the other rent sharing
indicators (Margolis-Salvanes measure, Lester’s range of pay, the Oswald’s
measure). A distributed lag model’s explanatory power is never higher than
that of the corresponding multivariate model with no lagged profits. This
may relate to the fact that the use of a distributed lag multivariate model
leads to a much smaller estimation sample than the one used in the static
multivariate models estimations and consequently the outlier observations
achieve a larger weight.
In order to assess the importance of shared rents for the magnitude of
average wages we consider again the estimates of the Margolis-Salvanes mea-
sure. Now the per-capita profits of table 1 are combined with the sum of the
current and one-period lagged pay-profits coefficients (= ρˆ0 + ρˆ1). When
operating profits are used as a ability-to-pay measure the corresponding
Margolis-Salvanes estimates show that after two years the total net effect
of shared rents has led to an 1.77-3.68 % increase in wages as compared to
the average wages without rent sharing. If profitability is measured by value
added the corresponding Margolis-Salvanes measures rise up to the range of
3.10-6.51 %. Thus even after controlling unobserved employee and firm ef-
fects rent sharing preserves a clear and non-ignorable long-run effect on the
white-collar employees’ salaries whereas the inclusion of lagged profits, for
its part, emphasises the special responsiveness of wage concept 3 and thereby
also of performance-related payments to changes in lagged profits. The eco-
nomic significance of the estimated rent sharing effects will be emphasised
even more when recalling our preceding assumption about operating profits
being likely to suffer from a negative endogeneity bias, thus making value
added potentially a more reliable basis for profit sharing estimates.
As before, explanatory power comparisons between models are restricted
to the intra-group comparisons of different ”within” R2s. There is again a
sharp drop in the within R-squares when profit-related payments are added
to salaries (concepts 5 and 6). This same result repeating itself even after
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the inclusion of lagged profits indicates that it is not caused by profit-related
payments being paid the following year they are actually earned. Appar-
ently, there is still unobserved time-variable inter-firm heterogeneity in the
prevailing pay practises of profit-related payments which we are not able to
capture in our regression models.
All in all, the parallel findings from the static and dynamic distributed
lag multivariate models suggest that the existence of rent sharing cannot be
disproved simply by explaining it to be due to misspecified estimation models
or omitted observed and unobserved firm and employee effects. Besides, the
observation that the measurement of profitability with value added generates
regularly substantially larger pay-profits effects than using operating profits
instead is interesting in two respects. Firstly, the findings supporting the rent
sharing hypothesis irrespective of which of the two alternative profitability
measures was used offers a direct proof of the robustness of the estimated
rent sharing effects. Secondly, in contrast to operating profits and as was
explained before, value added is not as likely to suffer from the same kind of
calculatory endogeneity bias. And therefore estimation results supporting the
existence of shared rents when using value added as a profitability measure
offer further reliability for our results.
5 Conclusions
We have analysed the question of whether monthly paid employees’ salaries
depend on the employer firm’s profitability in the Finnish metal and elec-
trotechnical industry. This was done using annual matched employer-employee
panel data for years 1995-2001 consisting of three extensive data sets: two sets
of private sector wage statistics and one consisting of firm-specific informa-
tion on the firms’ characteristics including profitability and other components
of financial statements.
A major novelty of the current study is to perform a stepwise analysis
in which each of the six different individual-level monthly wage concepts is
successively combined with two alternative profitability measures. In this
way we are not restricted to the customary analysis of whether rent sharing
concerns only one - more or less randomly chosen - wage specification. Instead
the chosen approach enables us to focus in more detail on whether rent
sharing is an equally important factor already at the base wage level, or
alternatively, whether it arises only after different bonus elements and over-
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time supplements are included in wage specifications.
According to the study even base salaries seem to vary with the employer
firm’s profitability. Using the most extensive multivariate model specification
covering, in addition to a number of observable firm and employee charac-
teristics, the unobserved time-constant firm and employee effects as well as
the current and one year lagged pay-profits effects the long-run elasticity of
monthly real base salary with respect to profits is 0.018 when profits are
measured by real operating profits per employee and 0.031 when profits are
measured by real value added per employee. The same model specification
produced net wage-raising effects of 1.77 % for the base salary when mea-
suring profits with operating profits and 3.10 % when using value added as
a profitability measure.
Wage concept 3 - consisting of base wage, benefits in kind, supplements
for shift and Sunday work and performance-related payments - produced the
largest estimates for the elasticity of monthly wages with respect to real per
capita profits in almost all model specifications. When the firm’s ability-to-
pay was measured by operating profits the estimated pay-profit elasticities of
wage concept 3 ranged from 0.032 to 0.036 depending on the model specifica-
tion. When financial performance was measured by value added the elastici-
ties were significantly higher ranging between 0.056 (static mean-differenced
model) and 0.063 (dynamic mean-differenced distributed lag model). Such
auxiliary components as company-wide profit-related bonuses or over-time
payments did not add anything particular in terms of the magnitude of shared
rents.
The net wage-raising effect as compared to the wage level without rent
sharing achieved its highest values when the wage concept 3 and the dynamic
mean-differenced distributed lag model were combined. In this case the net
long-run wage-raising effect was 3.68 per cent when measuring profits with
operating profits and 6.51 per cent when using value added as a profitability
measure. Since pay-profits estimates based on value added are not as likely to
suffer from the same kind of calculatory downward bias as operating profits
are to do the actual size of rent sharing might be closer to the value added
based estimates.34
34When using firm-employee data the calculatory endogeneity problem, however, is only
partial since the dependent wage variable is an employee-level variable while per-capita-
profits on the right hand side are defined at firm level. This means that the ”feedback” from
an exogenous (with respect to profits) increase in an individual wage is of less significance
to the employer firm’s profits (especially the larger the firm in question). Thus, in the
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The finding that base wages as well as direct performance- and profit-
related payment schemes are clearly responsive to firm profits adds to our
knowledge about the Finnish manufacturing sector’s wage determination in
several ways. Firstly, the finding that even base wages react to profitability
changes is interesting since base wages actually form the very basis from
which firms are supposed to start when converting the collective increases
into individual wages in euros. Especially, as collective wage increases are
often determined in percents of base wages (+ basic regular supplements),
the cumulative nature makes the role of base wages of a major importance
for any firm trying to estimate the development of its total labour costs
in the future. Furthermore, we have reason to believe that base wages are
fairly rigid downwards in contrast to performance- and profit-related bonus
payments. For these reasons firms have to think twice before they raise base
salaries.
Still it seems that the firm’s ability-to-pay affects even base wages. Natu-
rally this raises a question why the firms act in this way instead of confining
themselves to utilise potentially much more flexible direct performance- and
profit-related payment schemes only? The question will be left for future re-
search but we suspect that this may have something to do with the possibility
that even though base wages are rigid ex-post they are actually more flexible
for the employer to change (i.e. usually meaning wage increases wage cuts
being rare) immediately whenever financial or personnel policy reasons are
requiring that. Profit-related bonuses, being instead based on profitability ac-
counting covering often the entire financial year, are usually paid on a ex-post
basis and often during the following year they were actually earned. Further-
more, the profit-related bonus schemes may have another weakness. That is,
even performance-related payments, not to mention profit-related ones, are
often based on workers’ collective achievements making these schemes im-
practical to use when the firm would like to adjust only a certain smaller
group’s of workers individual wages or even only a single worker’s wage at a
time.
Secondly, our findings might hint at there being be an interesting connec-
tion between the wage drift phenomenon and base wages as well as performance-
and profit-related payments. Namely, the fact that our models control in
case of a firm-employee data (us ours) the negative bias pertaining to the use of operating
profits is likely to form quantitatively only a minor problem as compared to the case of
using firm-level data.
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great detail for the effects of individual productivity heterogeneity35 as well
as of collective wage increases36 means that the observed profitability effects
upon various earnings concepts represent a residual-like wage drift element
after the effects of collective wage increases as well productive heterogeneity
within the labour force are cancelled out. Furthermore, as fluctuations of
profits are idiosyncratic it seems that wage drift for the part of our various
different wage concepts can be described more accurately by non-competitive
rent sharing mechanisms than within a perfectly competitive labour market
framework.
Thirdly, after having controlled for observed and unobserved effects of
individual productivity differences to a large extent and still finding hetero-
geneity in individual wages within the one and same manufacturing sector,
we can conclude that the ”one-price” principle describes hardly the wage de-
termination of the Finnish metal and electrotechnical white-collar workers.
The conclusion is strengthened by the result of having managed to pinpoint
the source of the remaining heterogeneity as originating from a firm-specific
factor (i.e. per-capita profits) instead. Therefore we can conclude that the
observed residual-like heterogeneity within individual base wages as well as
performance- and profit-related bonuses is not consistent with the perfectly
competitive labour market model. The appropriate theoretical context for
all these wage components needs rather to be sought in the direction of the
theoretical non-competitive labour market scenarios such as the efficiency
wage and the implicit contracts theories.
In addition to wage drift another major issue arising in the current pa-
per is the rigidity aspect. Our findings show that the wages of the current
industry are not totally rigid. Even base wages respond to firm-specific fac-
tors and the already existing performance- and profit-related bonuses double
the flexibility estimates. However, the question whether the observed wage
flexibility is asymmetric so that wages are totally rigid downwards is still
open. Of course, this is a focal issue especially thinking about whether firms
have any other alternative but cutting their employment during a downswing.
Thus, a natural extension for future research would be to analyse whether
35The mean-deviated models capture the effects of observed and unobserved employee-
specific effects thus controlling for changes in the overall composition of labour force.
36The collective wage increases are captured by the use of annual dummies and by
the contractual homogeneity of the employee sample consisting exclusively of employees
working within the same industry and under two to three collective white-collar contracts
only.
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the observed pay-profits effects are symmetric with respect firm profitability.
Finally, we have also compared our rent sharing estimates with estimates
from previous international studies. The main conclusions obtained from
various applied measures were the following. First, all the adapted mea-
sures produced size estimates for the significance of shared rents at least
of the same magnitude as previous Nordic and Western-European findings.
Second, comparing findings from the US and especially from papers using
instrumented profits our estimates indicated that shared rents play a much
smaller roll within the Finnish wage determination system; at least for the
part of the metal industry’s white collar workers.
All in, the study highlights the importance of specifying both wages and
profitability variables in detail as well as careful microeconometric modelling.
These all put strict requirements on the quality of used data: detailed in-
formation on wages and other individual-specific characteristics need to be
combined with detailed firm-specific accounting information plus other firm
characteristics. In addition to these cross-sectional aspects the applied data
need to have a time-series dimension also enabling both the analysis over
time as well as the controlling of unobserved firm and worker fixed effects.
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Table 1: Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry firms’ profitability and
their monthly paid employees’ salaries 1995-2001.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Coeff. of
dev. variation
(1) Real monthly base salary (1995 e) 296625 2294.59 761.03 0.33
183920 2369.87 779.50 0.33
(2) Real monthly salary (1995 e):
consisting of real monthly base salary (1) +
benefits in kind + extra compensation 296625 2331.74 803.65 0.34
for shift and Sunday work 183920 2409.59 824.69 0.34
(3) Real monthly salary (1995 e):
consisting of real monthly salary (2) + 296625 2409.51 850.31 0.35
performance-related payments 183920 2503.89 876.17 0.35
(4)Real monthly salary with
overtime earnings (1995 e):
consisting of real monthly wage (3) + 296625 2447.95 859.17 0.35
overtime earnings per month 183920 2542.61 881.44 0.35
(5) Real monthly salary (1995 e):
consisting of real monthly salary (3) +
profit-related payments 183920 2506.02 877.23 0.35
(6) Real monthly salary with
overtime earnings (1995 e):
consisting of real monthly salary (5) +
overtime earnings per month 183920 2544.74 882.34 0.35
(7) Real annual operating profit 296625 52.5914 69.3938 1.32
per employee (1995 1000e) 183920 66.2108 82.2661 1.24
(8) Real annual value added 296625 89.7022 71.9876 0.80
per employee (1995 1000e) 183920 104.7188 83.9061 0.80
Notes:
1 All the wages and their components calculated on monthly basis.
2 Profit-related rewards available only from the year 1998 onwards.
3 Profitability variables are calculated on yearly basis and divided by the annual average
number of hourly and monthly paid employees of the corresponding firm. The proceeds
of sales of tangible capital goods are excluded.
4 The means and standard deviations of all the wage specifications are calculated directly
from the employee sample while the means and standard deviations of the profitability
variables are calculated from firm-level figures using firm-specific proportions of monthly
paid employees as weights.
5 Coefficient of variation measures standard deviation in proportion to mean.
6 The number of observations tells the corresponding estimation period (1995-2001 vs.
1998-2001). 36
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Table 3: Finnish metal and electrotechnical industry firms’ profitability 1995-
2001.
Real operating Real value
profits per added per
employee employee
Year Mean Std. dev. Coeff. of Mean Std. dev. Coeff. of
variation variation
1995 25.01719 29.15382 1.165 59.24043 28.72545 0.485
(11.01484) (28.96395) (2.63) (42.48277) (28.15707) (0.663)
1996 28.22115 24.95325 0.884 63.71453 41.83735 0.657
(16.0309) (44.92884) (2.803) (53.06562) (124.5063) (2.346)
1997 36.65177 30.81109 0.841 71.3357 29.33754 0.411
(17.19962) (23.46843) (1.364) (49.30028) (25.83306) (0.524)
1998 46.29441 49.67852 1.073 83.01507 50.48548 0.608
(14.6857) (20.58834) (1.402) (46.85685) (22.73786) (0.485)
1999 57.343 86.55072 1.509 94.75123 86.87 0.917
(13.15199) (25.49656) (1.939) (46.23616) (35.73843) (0.773)
2000 78.01971 99.93356 1.281 116.524 100.2998 0.861
(16.19257) (31.36941) (1.937) (49.37974) (32.78369) (0.664)
2001 79.81173 77.83999 0.975 120.8329 81.98708 0.679
(14.48875) (20.22252) (1.396) (48.41062) (23.09389) (0.477)
All 52.56428 69.37903 1.320 89.67198 71.97341 0.803
(14.77483) (30.53025) (2.066) (48.11952) (55.98794) (1.32)
Notes:
1The means and standard deviations of both profitability variables have been calculated
by using firm-specific proportions of monthly paid employees as weights.
2The alternative means and standard deviations have been calculated by using constant
firm-specific unit-weights for each firm-year combination in the data. These statistics as
well as the corresponding coefficients of variations are presented in the parentheses.
3All the means and standard deviations denoted in thousands of 1995 euros.
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